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THE OVERLOOKED BENEFITS OF  
THE BLACKSTONE PRINCIPLE 
John Bronsteen∗ & Jonathan S. Masur∗∗ 
There are two ways to read Daniel Epps’s fascinating and provoca-
tive article, The Consequences of Error in Criminal Justice.1  One way 
is this: the article shows that the Blackstone principle — the principle 
that more effort should be made to avoid false convictions than false 
acquittals — may well produce many consequences that are often 
overlooked.  Some of those overlooked consequences are positive, oth-
ers are negative, and it is unclear whether those overlooked conse-
quences make the principle more or less desirable on the whole than it 
was previously thought to be.2  We agree with those points, and in 
making them Epps contributes significantly to the literature on crimi-
nal justice. 
The other way to read Epps’s article is this: the article claims that 
the Blackstone principle may well have bad overall consequences, or 
at least that the principle has worse consequences (especially for inno-
cent criminal defendants) than it is typically assumed to have.  We do 
not think those conclusions follow from the principle’s overlooked ef-
fects that Epps identifies.  So in our view, the best way to read his ar-
ticle is the first way: Epps shows that the Blackstone principle has 
more complicated effects than people realize, and those effects may be 
positive, negative, or neutral on the whole. 
Because Epps focuses almost exclusively on the negative features of 
the overlooked effects, we focus on their positive features.  First, we 
discuss the crime reduction and other benefits that could result from 
the effects Epps identifies.  Second, we explain how social science evi-
dence on prison and well-being reveals unappreciated benefits of the 
Blackstone principle.  Epps is right that the Blackstone principle 
should be viewed from a dynamic perspective.  But that perspective 
may serve to reveal the principle’s unnoticed strengths, even more 
than its weaknesses. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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 1 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (2015). 
 2 Indeed, the answer may depend at least in part on what one’s previous view of the principle 
was.  The principle has many defenders but also, as Epps notes, some staunch critics.  E.g., id. at 
1089–92. 
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I.  POSITIVE DYNAMIC EFFECTS 
The main argument against the Blackstone principle is that it in-
creases crime.3  That is, if procedural safeguards make it harder to 
convict those accused of crimes, then there will be less deterrence and 
incapacitation and therefore more law-breaking.  One of Epps’s main 
points is that this increase in crime harms not only potential victims 
but also criminal defendants — the very people the Blackstone princi-
ple is supposed to help.4  This occurs, according to Epps, in large part 
because society responds to increased crime by broadening criminal 
statutes, reducing other procedural protections, and, most importantly, 
increasing the length of prison sentences.5 
If Epps is right about all of this, however, then the broader crimi-
nal statutes, reduced procedural protections, and longer prison sen-
tences of the Blackstonian world themselves reduce crime via deter-
rence and (perhaps especially) incapacitation relative to the 
alternatives in the non-Blackstonian world.  So if the picture Epps 
paints is right, then the Blackstonian world is one in which any would-
be criminal will be harder to convict in some ways but easier to con-
vict in other ways, and will face a longer sentence if convicted.  
Whether that arrangement is better or worse than the one in a non-
Blackstonian world — in terms of crime reduction or otherwise — is 
utterly uncertain.  On the one hand, one might argue that certainty of 
punishment deters crime more than does severity of punishment, and 
that criminals are more likely to be convicted and punished in the non-
Blackstonian world (though that is far from certain).6  On the other 
hand, one might argue that keeping would-be recidivists locked up for 
long periods of time without having to release them, catch them again, 
and convict them again each time, gives the Blackstonian world an 
advantage.  It is not clear which system, Blackstonian or non-
Blackstonian, is preferable. 
In addition, a major benefit of the Blackstone principle is that 
some potential innocent defendants are not even charged in a world 
with the principle but would be charged and acquitted in a world 
without it.7  Being charged and acquitted is typically much worse for 
someone than not being charged at all.  The decision to charge imposes 
substantial burdens on the accused, burdens that do not entirely dissi-
pate even if the individual is eventually acquitted.8  Epps disagrees, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 3 See, e.g., id. 
 4 See id. at 1099–1102. 
 5 See id. at 1102–06. 
 6 E.g., id. at 1095. 
 7 Id. at 1111, 1114 n.239. 
 8 See Andrew D. Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1297, 1301–14 (2000). 
  
2015] BENEFITS OF BLACKSTONE PRINCIPLE 291 
dismissing the concern with only this sentence: “But the costs to such 
innocents are likely not large, because in a non-Blackstonian system an 
arrest without a conviction would carry less stigma than it would in 
our world.”9  This rejoinder is surprising, however, because Epps 
himself acknowledges the potential weakness of his claim about 
changes in stigma: “[S]ome of the principle’s dynamic costs may be 
fairly marginal.  For example, the additional stigma that acquitted in-
nocent defendants suffer may be real but small in any given case.”10  
If Epps is right that there would not be much difference between the 
stigma of being charged but acquitted in a Blackstonian and non-
Blackstonian world, it undercuts his claim that the benefit of avoiding 
a charge in a non-Blackstonian world is “likely not large.”11 
On the other hand, if the stigma of an arrest — as well as that of a 
conviction12 — turns out to be much smaller in a world without the 
Blackstone principle, then the Blackstone principle creates an over-
looked deterrent benefit by increasing the stigmatic harm that would-
be criminals face if they are caught.  This factor belongs in Epps’s cal-
culus of costs and benefits because it is Epps himself who argues that 
the factor exists.13  Once these additional benefits are added to the  
accounting, the idea of moving to a non-Blackstonian world becomes 
less appealing.  Indeed, it is possible that a dynamic analysis of the 
type Epps suggests would provide even stronger justification for the 
Blackstone principle than scholars have previously supposed. 
II.  HEDONICS AND PRISON 
We can try to obtain some purchase on the competing dynamic  
effects of the Blackstone principle by looking to the literature on he-
donic psychology.  Analysis of the hedonic effects of prison suggests 
that the Blackstone principle may be helping innocent defendants  
far more than it harms them.  One of Epps’s central points is that 
there is a tradeoff between the length of prison sentences and the like-
lihood of conviction.  Epps argues that if we were to do away with the 
Blackstone principle, higher conviction rates would enable shorter 
prison sentences for individuals who were convicted.14  This would 
provide a benefit to innocent defendants who would be convicted in 
either world, counterbalancing (at least to some degree) the fact that a 
higher percentage of innocents would be convicted in a non-
Blackstonian world.  We do not know whether sentences would actu-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 Epps, supra note 1, at 1114 n.239. 
 10 Id. at 1122. 
 11 Id. at 1114 n.239. 
 12 E.g., id. at 1099–1102. 
 13 See id. 
 14 Id. at 1112. 
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ally be reduced, but let us suppose that Epps is correct.  The question 
then becomes: How much will innocent defendants benefit from short-
er prison sentences in a non-Blackstonian world?  Will this benefit be 
substantial, or will it be dwarfed by the increased risk of wrongful 
convictions in the first place? 
It is impossible to know how many more innocent defendants will 
be wrongfully convicted in a non-Blackstonian world, so we cannot 
compute that side of the balance sheet.  But research from hedonic 
psychology sheds considerable light on the issue of how much wrong-
fully convicted defendants will benefit from shorter prison sentences.  
As we have explored in depth elsewhere, the difference between the 
respective harm of long and short prison sentences is far smaller than 
most people assume15 — scholars, judges, legislators, and citizens in-
cluded.  There are two reasons for this.  First, people adapt to many 
aspects of life in prison.16  They form social networks, develop coping 
mechanisms, and generally become accustomed to life behind bars.  
The tenth year that someone spends in prison is not nearly as bad for 
that person as the first.  Second, having been in prison causes people to 
suffer a wide variety of negative effects that persist even after they are 
released.17  Ex-prisoners have trouble preserving or reestablishing fam-
ily and social relationships; they have difficulty finding work; and they 
are often afflicted with serious chronic diseases.18  Surprisingly, these 
effects are almost equally pronounced whether the individual spent 
one year in prison or ten (or twenty).19  These types of harms are also 
very difficult to adapt to, and they exert a consistently negative force 
on former inmates’ lives years after they have been released.20 
This means that even if Epps were right to suggest that a wrongly 
convicted defendant might face a twenty-year sentence in a 
Blackstonian world and a ten-year sentence in a non-Blackstonian 
world, the practical difference between the two sentences would be 
much smaller than one might imagine.  The last ten years in prison are 
not as bad as the first ten years, and even after a prisoner is released 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009). 
 16 See id. at 1046–49. 
 17 Id. at 1049. 
 18 See id. at 1049–52. 
 19 Id. at 1050.  It is possible that the negative effects of prison on relationships and employ-
ment might be ameliorated somewhat if, as Epps postulates, eliminating the Blackstone principle 
mitigated the stigma associated with prison.  However, we suspect that reduced stigma — if in 
fact it materializes — will have a small impact on these harms.  The reason is that they are not 
caused entirely (or necessarily even predominantly) by stigma.  Rather, prison is maladaptive to 
regular life: the coping strategies that allow prisoners to survive in prison make it harder for them 
to function on the outside.  This, in turn, makes interpersonal relationships and employment more 
difficult to maintain after release. 
 20 Id. at 1049–55. 
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(earlier, in the non-Blackstonian world), the years after release are not 
as good as one might expect.21  To be sure, it is very likely worse to 
serve a longer sentence than a shorter one.  But the amount by which 
it is worse is smaller than almost everyone assumes.  And that amount 
is dwarfed by the benefit (to an innocent person) of never having been 
incarcerated in the first place.  Accordingly, if the Blackstone principle 
decreases the chance that an innocent defendant will go to prison by 
(for instance) twenty-five percent, but increases by a proportionate 
amount the sentence that such a defendant will serve if convicted, then 
that accounting cuts dramatically in favor of the Blackstone princi-
ple.22  The sentence reductions in a non-Blackstonian world would 
have to be enormous and wholly disproportionate to the increased rate 
of conviction for innocent defendants to benefit.23 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Epps has written a deeply interesting, provocative, and novel arti-
cle on a topic that many might have felt was well settled.  His article is 
thus a valuable contribution.  In this Response, we’ve endeavored to 
demonstrate that by focusing almost exclusively on the unexplored 
negative effects of the Blackstone principle, Epps overlooks the posi-
tive effects of the very same phenomena he believes cause the Black-
stone principle’s negative effects.  Of course, it remains impossible to 
know whether the Blackstone principle’s benefits exceed its costs, in 
large degree because the magnitudes of these competing effects are im-
possible to determine.  Where data do exist, however — in the form of 
hedonic psychology studies of prison and its effects — those data cut 
strongly in favor of the Blackstone principle and against any legal 
change that would send a higher percentage of innocent defendants to 
prison.  In the end, it is not clear whether Epps’s dynamic analysis, 
even if correct, would render the Blackstone principle more or less de-
sirable than it was previously thought to be. 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 Id. 
 22 Indeed, one could argue on this ground that the Blackstone principle should be strength-
ened and that the status quo does not do enough to protect innocent defendants from wrongful 
convictions. 
 23 The hedonics literature would not necessarily support the Blackstone principle if Epps were 
right that the principle increases the number (while reducing the rate) of false convictions due to 
increasing crime.  Epps, supra note 1, at 1112–13.  But as we explained in Part I of this Response, 
it is utterly uncertain whether the Blackstone principle results in more crime even if Epps is right 
about the dynamic effects that flow from the principle. 
